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Socio-Legal Definitions of Family
Jean H. Thoresen
Eastern Connecticut State University
ABSTRACT
Recent decisions in family law cases suggest that some courts are ready to broaden
the judicial definition of "family," and to create or accept a definition that extends the
traditional notion of what constitutes a "family." This provides sociologists with an
opportunity to work within or coordinate with the legal system in redefining "family"
to provide a more inclusive concept which courts could then apply.
As "family" evolves in contemporary society, our definitions of family are
expanding to include single-parent families, blended families, gay families, and
various alternative constructions of the social reality of units of individuals who
live together and take on financial and emotional responsibility for each other.
Sociologists have been relatively willing and able to deal with, and in many
instances have helped to create and legitimize, these expanding definitions of
family. However, the definitions sociologists often create, accept, and use may
not be those of the wider society; we are often on top of the wheel as it turns.
The law, as a basically conservative institution, is sometimes slower to rec-
ognize and incorporate new definitions of basic institutions. However, during
the last decade, various courts have been wrestling with expanded definitions
of "family." These definitions are important because courts are often the fi-
nal arbiters of marriage arrangements, parenting arrangements, foster parenting
An earlier version of this paper was accepted for presentation at the 1990 Annual Meet-
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arrangements, property division upon divorce, custody and visitation arrange-
ments, and many other matters that affect individuals in families.1
The purpose of this paper is to examine some ways in which courts have
defined "family," and to explore the role that sociologists can have as consultants
to lawyers and/or courts in educating the legal community to the sociological
reality of what "family" might include. It also makes some suggestions as to
how a new and expanded definition of family could be used to help nonstandard
families gain some of the legal rights normally accorded without question to
more traditional family units.
It is important to note that, while domestic relations law is a creature of
statute in specific jurisdictions, and primarily a matter of state law and, therefore,
state legislative action, the role of the judge is to interpret what legislatures
create. Sociologists who wish to influence the emerging definitions of "family"
under the law may find working with legislatures their most productive arena.
In this paper, however, I am interested in what courts (judges) do with the
statutory parameters they are given. Additionally, as will be evident from the
cases cited, some issues that involve defining family are not a matter of domestic
relations (state) law, but of interpretation of things such as zoning regulations
that originate at a local rather than a state level. Thus, the types of official
pronouncements that can affect how people are allowed to form and/or live
in families are highly varied and differ tremendously by jurisdiction. It is not
the intent of this paper to provide a compendium of current domestic relations
statutes jurisdiction by jurisdiction; that can be obtained by perusing appropriate
state law, which is available in most libraries. Rather, I am interested in the social
reality courts construct as they attempt to interpret the meanings of statutes and
ordinances that are involved when courts carry out their function of making
case-by-case determinations of what a "family" is when confronted with a real
case or controversy.
Emerging Case Law
The fairly recent case of Borough of Glassboro v. Vallorosi2 provides an
example of what courts have been up to lately in terms of defining "family." A
group of ten male college students was held to constitute a "family" within the
meaning of a restrictive zoning ordinance, by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The borough of Glassboro had sought an injunction to prevent the students
from using or occupying a home located in one of the borough's residential
districts under a municipal zoning ordinance limiting residence in the borough's
residential districts to stable and permanent "single housekeeping units" that
constituted either a "traditional family unit" or its "functional equivalent." (With
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statutes drafted in such language, it's no wonder sociologists can feel at home
in the legal thickets; the legislator's aide who came up with the "functional
equivalent" terminology was undoubtedly suffering from a relapse into SOC
100.) The house was owned by one student's parents through a real estate
investment partnership. The students, most of whom were sophomores, shared
the house's one kitchen, as well as household chores, grocery shopping, and
yard work. They maintained a common checking account to pay for food and
other household bills. The students all intended to remain tenants as long as they
were enrolled at Glassboro State College. The court concluded that these facts
reflected a plan by the students to live together for three years under conditions
that corresponded substantially to the ordinance's requirement of a "stable and
permanent living unit," and thus upheld a lower court's decision.
The recent decision in Vallorosi is in accord with a series of decisions.
In Carroll v. City of Miami Beach 3, a district court in Florida decided that a
local ordinance's definition of family, based, as in Vallorosi, on the concept of
a "single housekeeping unit," was broad enough to include a small group of
novices who were to live together under the supervision of a Mother Superior
in a house owned by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Miami. In Village of
Belle Terre v. Borass,4 the Supreme Court held that a Long Island ordinance
incorporating the "single housekeeping unit" definition of family would allow
six students at SUNY Stony Brook to be a "family" for purposes of meeting
zoning requirements, thus providing precedent for Vallorosi and suggesting that
family can indeed be defined according to the concept of a functional equivalent.
Not all recent decisions, however, have accepted the precedent, and specific
language can evade the intent signalled by the Court in Borass. In 1981, the
Supreme Court of Maine held, in Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp.
v. City of Brewer,5 that a group home population of six mentally retarded adults
and rotating pairs of nonresidential supervisory employees who would be in the
home in shifts did not meet the local zoning ordinance requirements for single-
family dwellings, because the local ordinance defined "family" as follows:
"Family" is a single individual doing his own cooking, and living upon
the premises as a separate housekeeping unit, or a collective body of
persons doing their own cooking and living together upon the premises
as a separate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based upon
birth, marriage, or other domestic bond as distinguished from a group
occupying a boarding house, lodging house, club, fraternity or hotel.
While the Maine court arguably could have seen the residents and staff of the
group home as the functional equivalent of a family even under that language,
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had it chosen to interpret the roles of the individuals with each other as com-
prising the functional equivalent of a "domestic bond," such a reading could
be criticized as judicial activism since there is no mention in the statute of a
"functional equivalent" of a domestic bond. Instead, the court chose, reason-
ably, according to judicial practice, to interpret the language according to its
"plain meaning," which did not encompass the idea of functional equivalency.
The court said, "the concept of 'domestic bond' implies the existence of a tra-
ditional [my emphasis] family-like structure of household authority," and that
shift rotation of supervisory employees did not meet that criterion, as "[s]uch a
structure would include one or more resident [my emphasis] authority figures
charged with the responsibility of maintaining a separate housekeeping unit and
regulating the activity and duties of the other residents." This resident authority
figure's role, the court says, would by definition include "stabilizing and coor-
dinating household activity in a way that is consistent with family values and a
family style of life."
How can one reconcile Penobscot with the principle utilized in Carroll,
adopted in Borass, and followed in Vallorosi? Certainly, one could argue that it
is merely a matter of statutory interpretation, that is, a parsing of the language
specifically adopted by appropriate legislative bodies in creating the ordinances
in question. But, as I suggested above, there was also the possibility that the
Maine court could have presumed the existence of the idea of functional equiv-
alency when applied to "domestic bond" terminology in the Brewer statute
because the idea of using the concept of functional equivalency had already
been used in similar zoning restriction cases. Arguably, the Maine court was
right; had the city of Brewer intended to recognize the concept of functional
equivalency, it could have done so in the language of the statute itself. How-
ever, zoning statutes are often of long standing, and nothing prevents courts
from introducing modern notions in their interpretations.
A less charitable, but perhaps more sociologically based, suggestion is that
nuns and college students are perceived to make better neighbors than are men-
tally retarded adults and their supervisory personnel. Perhaps there is something
different in the supervision of novices and the supervision of mentally retarded
adults trying to adapt to independent living conditions.6 Perhaps what we have
here is a judicially approved, and therefore more sophisticated and sanitized,
version of "NIMBY" ("Not In My Back Yard").
What should be inducible from these examples is the power of courts to
interpret, and therefore create, definitions of "family" as they go about their
duty of determining the "true" meaning of the legislatively produced statutes
and ordinances under which we live. If reality is a social construction, courts
are doing their part.7
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Given current legal definitions, what is requisite today to be a family? The
aforementioned cases suggest some basic elements:
1. Live together, sharing one kitchen.
2. Have a joint checking account or some less formal but shared financial
arrangement for handling household expenses.8
3. Do the work of the household together.
4. Intend to remain together as a family, at least for a while.
There is one other element that stems essentially from the common law:
5. "Holding oneself out to the community" as a family.
A case that examines this idea with regard to marriage and family is Ellam
v. Ellam.9 Here is the court's opinion in that case, quoted somewhat extensively
as an example of judicial socio-logic (and a slice of daily life):
Plaintiff instituted suit March 1, 1974, seeking a divorce on the
grounds of separation. Defendant's amended counterclaim for divorce
charges the plaintiff with desertion.
The parties, who are childless, purchased a home in Elizabeth and
commenced moving into their home in June 1972. They were experi-
encing severe matrimonial difficulties at the time and, according to the
plaintiff, he moved to his mother's home in nearby Roselle on or about
July 5 and did not thereafter live with defendant.
Although his testimony that the parties thereafter never had sexual
relations was not challenged, on cross-examination it developed that
the parties nevertheless maintained many aspects of their relationship
until May 1973.
On weekday mornings plaintiff's mother would drive him in her
car from her home to the corner of his street in Elizabeth. He would
walk to his house, let himself in, pet the dog, occasionally kiss his
wife "good morning" and, as he put it, "make sure everything was
OK." He would then leave the house, take his car out of the garage
and proceed to work. When he finished work, or the night classes he
was attending, he returned to the matrimonial home. He would play
with his dog, converse with defendant and, after she retired, watch
television until approximately 12:30 a.m. At that time his mother would
arrive to pick him up in her car and take him to her home to sleep,
leaving his car in the garage at the marital home. Plaintiff would spend
weekends at the marital home doing housecleaning, cutting the lawn
and performing similar household chores. He occasionally ate his meals
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there, bringing the food with him. On other occasions the parties ate
together at plaintiff's mother's home. During this period of time the
parties as a couple continued to accept social engagements and once
she accompanied him out-of-state to attend a convention lasting several
days. They shared a hotel room but did not engage in sexual relations.
Plaintiff, in explaining his continued presence in the matrimonial
home, stated that he loved his wife, loved his dog even more, felt
obliged to maintain the premises, and, as he stresses, did not want the
neighbors to know that he and defendant had separated.
The question presented is whether the foregoing constitutes liv-
ing "separate and apart in different habitations" within the meaning of
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2(d).
The court construes the New Jersey statute in question by looking at similar
cases involving similar and slightly different laws in sister jurisdictions.
In DeRienzo v. DeRienzo, 119 NJ.Super. 192, 290 A.2d 742 (Ch.
Div.1972), it was held that the words "in different habitations" pre-
cluded the granting of a divorce where the parties occupied the same
house, although plaintiff slept alone in a locked bedroom for which
only he had the key. This language in our statute was the basis for
the court distinguishing the holding in that case from cases hold-
ing to the contrary in jurisdictions which also recognize separation
as grounds for divorce. Thus in Delaware, where the statute requires
that the parties live "separate and apart without any cohabitation"
(13 Del.C, §1522(11)), it was held that a divorce could be granted
where the parties occupied the same residence, there being no provi-
sion in that statute mandating separate dwellings. Heckman v. Heck-
man, 245 A.2d 550 (Del.Sup.Ct.1968). A similar holding was reached
under the District of Columbia statute which stated the grounds to
be a "voluntary separation from bed and board for five consecutive
years without cohabitation" (D.C.Code (1940) §16–403, 49 Stat. 539).
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 1968). In those jurisdictions
the test is not separate roofs, but separate lives. See Hurd v. Hurd, 86
U.S.App.D.C. 62, 179 F.2d 68 (D.C.Cir.1949). Since every word and
clause of our statute should be given effect, and a construction which
renders any part superfluous must be avoided, Hoffman v. Hock, 8 N.J.
397, 86 A.2d 121 (1952), our statute clearly requires both. That is,
the parties must occupy "different habitations" and must live "separate
and apart."
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Here plaintiff arguably resided with his mother, since he slept,
took some meals and kept his clothes, all at her home. But with the
additional exception of sexual intercourse, the parties continued their
relationship substantially the same as prior to his moving. When he
was not working or attending classes, basically all of plaintiff's waking
hours were spent with defendant.
His plea that their social intercourse was strained and rife with
arguments goes to the quality of their association, not its substance.
Generally speaking, the policy of our present divorce law is to terminate
dead marriages. Brittner v. Brittner, 124 N.J.Super. 259, 306 A.2d 83
(Ch.Div.1973). But the Legislature, following the recommendation of
the Divorce Law Study Commission in requiring the objective proof of
the lack of viability in the relationship, has laid down specific criteria
in determining what marriages are eligible for dissolution. See Final
Report of the Divorce Law Study Commission 73 (1970). Thus, if the
parties were not in fact living separate and apart as required by the
statute, a mere finding that their relationship was bereft of positive
qualities is insufficient.
The court then offers its opinion as to what "social construction of reality"
is required for a divorce to be granted, as representing an actual cessation of
marriage:
In other jurisdictions, where the parties have continued some de-
gree of relationship after they have ceased sexual cohabitation, divorces
have been granted on grounds of separation, provided that it is neverthe-
less manifest to the community that the parties are in fact living separate
lives and are not attempting to induce others to regard them as living
together. Young v. Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (Sup.Ct.1945);
Christiansen v. Christiansen, 68 R.I. 438, 28 A.2d 745 (Sup.Ct. 1942);
Hava V. Chavigny, 147 La. 330, 84 So. 892 (Sup.Ct. 1920); Brimson
v. Brimson, 227 Ark. 1045, 304 S.W.2d 935 (Sup.Ct. 1957). Compare
Adams v. Adams, 89 Idaho 84, 403 P.2d 593 (Sup.Ct. 1965). See An-
notation, 35 A.L.R.3d 1238.
It has been said that what the law makes a ground for divorce
is the living separately and apart of the husband and wife continu-
ously for a certain number of years. This separation implies something
more than a discontinuance of sexual relations whether the discon-
tinuance is occasioned by the refusal of the wife to continue them
or not. It implies the living apart for such period in such a manner
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that those in the neighborhood may see that the husband and wife
are not living together. [17 Am.Jur., §162 at 232, cited in Dudley
v. Dudley, 225 N.C. 83, 33 S.E.2d 489 (Sup.Ct.1945); emphasis
supplied.]
Where, as here, it is apparent that the associations and dealings
of the parties with each other after the alleged separation continue to
include a substantial number of the many elements and ties which go
into and make up the marital relationship and bind the parties together,
it cannot be said that they are living "separate and apart" within the
meaning of our divorce statute.
The court therefore holds that although plaintiff and defendant may
have been residing in different habitations for more than 18 months,
they were not living separate and apart.
A motion to dismiss the complaint at the conclusion of plaintiff's
proof is granted.
One wonders whether this gentleman's love for his wife or his dog was more
central to his wish to spend a great deal of time in the matrimonial home! What
is important to note, however, is that he also desired to keep the neighbors from
knowing the real state of matrimonial affairs in his household. And that involves
one of the essential elements of marriage and family that any sociologist would
identify: that it is a public status, often, though not necessarily, attested to by a
public rite of passage that announces one's change of status to the collectivity
of concerned individuals—those family members, friends, and neighbors with
whom one conducts social business.
Roles for Sociologists
As definitions of family change, one thing that may be important to some
sociologists is that individuals living in various nontraditional families be able
to claim equally legitimated public status. Sociologists can help in this effort by
making the act of "coming out," the act of public declaration, less dangerous and
frightening for single-parent families, blended families, gay families, and other
alternative family units. They can do this by encouraging an environment of
tolerance and acceptance for members of nontraditional families and by aiding
legal processes that broaden our definitions of family, not just legally, but, as
a consequence, socially. In a sense, sociologists can continue to do what they
have often done best over the past several decades: remind us of the costs of
prejudice and discrimination and the necessity for building a society of inclusion
rather than exclusion.
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One primary option might involve consulting with legislators, both state and
local, on drafting bills and creating statutory language and writing ordinances.
Since much work of courts does involve interpretation of statutory language,
how a bill is drafted and the definitions of concepts such as "family" which it
adopts, are obviously crucial. Sociologists could offer to provide synopses of
recent professional literature or statistical analyses to legislators. For instance,
many legislators who make it a practice to eulogize the "traditional family" may
not realize how few family units actually consist of one employed husband, a
wife who does not work outside the home, two kids, and a dog. It might be
productive to provide such information for legislators and to provide statistical
analyses of their actual constituencies as well. Sociologists, as well as political
scientists, have a long history of productive research in these areas.
What else can sociologists do? They can involve themselves in what the
courts are doing on such an important matter as constructing the definition
of family that will be utilized in official actions. One of the most important
roles sociologists can fill is that of the expert witness. The role of the expert
witness in legal proceedings is critical because expert witnesses may do what
other witnesses are not allowed to do: offer opinions. Once an individual has
been qualified in a case as an expert witness, that witness may, on the basis
of professional expertise and judgment, offer opinions that can guide the court
in its decision. One recent case provides an example of the sociologist at work
as an expert witness. In 2–4 Realty Associates v. Pittman, 10 Dr. Peter Stein
testified as an expert witness. His qualifications included an academic position
and "five books and twenty articles in the area of his expertise, the family in
America," and the court stated that "Dr. Stein was an impressive addition to
respondent's case."11 Dr. Stein's testimony enabled a mother and her son, who
had created a nonmarital family unit with a man who died from diabetes at the
age of 93, to continue to live in a rent-controlled apartment that had been held
formally in tenancy only by the man who died. Under the law, only "family
members" can continue to inhabit rent-controlled apartments. Dr. Stein offered
the opinion that the three individuals constituted a family unit, and, on the basis
of his testimony, the court agreed.12
Sociologists can make a strong effort to see that Sociology courses are
suggested as part of undergraduate curricula defined as "pre-law" or appropriate
to pre-legal education. The American Bar Association maintains a Commission
on College and University Nonprofessional Legal Studies,13 which serves as a
clearinghouse for syllabus material, runs national conferences,14 and generally
concerns itself with what those who are to become lawyers will learn before
they go to law school. Sociologists could become more involved in working
with such organizations.
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Another possibility would be for sociologists to offer noncredit workshops
or even CEU-bearing courses for local lawyers in their vicinity. The Connecticut
Bar Association recently offered a CEU-bearing six-week seminar in "Law and
Literature" for its members. It is certainly as plausible to conceptualize a seminar
in family issues for family law practitioners.15
An issue that has recently surfaced, as general recognition dawns that "fam-
ily" is an emergent concept these days, is the idea of recognizing "domestic
partnerships" as the functional equivalents of other, more traditional family
structures. The concept of a domestic partnership generally involves two adults
who are living together but are "unrelated" in the sense of birth, marriage, or
adoption, and who form a household unit. Often these are heterosexuals who
simply do not want to get married for various reasons of their own, but part-
nered gay people also fit this definition. There has been great interest lately,
as the cost of health care has exploded, in bringing partners in under the um-
brella of health care insurance coverage held by one partner only. Typically,
one partner works for an agency or corporation that has good benefits, while the
other may be self-employed or work for a small firm without adequate policies.
A secondary issue is that coverage for "family" members under the plan of
one partner is generally much less expensive than alternative separate private
insurance arrangements for the uninsured partner. Legislation of this type has
recently been passed for municipal employees in San Francisco, and has been
hailed as a great advance by those who advocate recognizing homosexual and
lesbian partnerships as "families." Those sociologists who see a definition of
family as expansive enough to include such partnerships could provide a ser-
vice by helping local and state gay task forces to draft and develop rationales
for such legislation in their jurisdictions. Domestic partner legislation commonly
includes a requirement that partners must agree to be held responsible for each
other's incurred financial obligations, which may include medical costs, in order
to be covered under a family premium arrangement. Sociologists could support
attempts to create legislative recognition of domestic partnership arrangements,
based on the fact that such partnerships fit a sociologically based definition of
family. Such recognition represents good public policy at a time when leaving
people uncovered by health insurance seems a major risk to the general health
and well-being of the individual and the society as a whole.
Another area where sociologists may be able to expand the definition of
family includes developing clauses in contractual arrangements covering terms
and conditions of employment. For example, a contractual provision regarding
sick leave, funeral leave, or family care leave often must include a definition of
"immediate family." "Husband, wife, father, mother, sister, brother, or child, or
any other person who is domiciled in the member's household" is the current
SOCIO-LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF FAMILY 69
definition for purposes of funeral leave used in at least one faculty contract.16
This may be particularly relevant for sociologists employed at colleges and uni-
versities governed by collective bargaining or less formal faculty/administration
negotiations, and who enjoy the chance to construct the definitions of reality
that govern their day-to-day lives.17
Whatever the personal or political involvement that individual sociologists
choose to undertake in regard to legislative or judicial activities involving fam-
ilies, it is clear that the discipline as a whole has at least an opportunity, and
perhaps an obligation, to have sociologically refined definitions of family con-
sidered by those in policy-making positions. Legislatures and courts are going
to go about their business regardless of whether we involve ourselves or not;
as the cases presented here have demonstrated, definitional construction of re-
ality proceeds apace. Perhaps our only question is the degree to which we wish
to be included in the forces constructing the reality in which we live, and the
ways in which we may implement our desire to be included, should that be
our conclusion.
NOTES
1. While legislatures are responsible for creating the statutes that define many, if not most, issues
in domestic relations law, courts interpret what legislatures create. Courts are therefore among our
most important sources of the social constructions of reality, and it is for this reason that court
decisions can prove especially interesting to sociologists.
2. NJ SupCt, 1/20/90.
3. 198 So.2d 643 (1967).
4. 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
5. 434 A.2d 14 (1981).
6. Perhaps it is an idiosyncratic notion, but it seems ironic that the mentally retarded adults are
trying to become more independent and "adult," and to take their places as functioning members
of the larger community, while the novices may be attempting to become less well-functioning
members of the larger community, in that they are choosing in a sense to withdraw from it, and
to submerge their independent thought and action into the accepted ideas and practices of the total
institution which is their order.
7. It is worth noting that courts are not the only official entities engaged in this activity. The
U.S. Census bases its count on "housekeeping units" defined by shared cooking facilities, and the
recent (1990) form included the idea of "unrelated partners" as a possible definition of household
membership.
8. The merging of finances need not be demonstrated by class-based practices such as joint check-
ing accounts. In 2–4 Realty Associates v. Pittman (523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.City Civ. Ct. 1987); 137
Misc.2d 898 (1987); 547 N.Y.Supp.2d 515 (Sup. 1989)), the court accepted merged finances ev-
idenced by a pooling of small amounts of money in a cookie jar as the functional equivalent of
something like a joint checking account for household expenses. (Personal communication with
Dr. Peter Stein, who served as an expert witness in the case. See further discussion of the role of
sociologists as expert witness in the following pages.)
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9. 132 N.J. Super. 358, 333 A.2d 577 (1975).
10. 523 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y.City Civ. Ct. 1987); 137 Misc. 2d 898; 547 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. 1989)).
11. 523 N.Y.S.2d 9; 137 Misc. 2d 901.
12. The criteria for determining whether an unrelated group of individuals form a family, which
Dr. Stein used and which he pointed out are widely agreed on by experts in this area, are: "(1)
the longevity of relationships; (2) the level of commitment and support among its members. This
support includes both material and emotional support; (3) the sense in which the individuals define
themselves as a family unit, using terms such as 'son' and 'father,' for example, and also the way
that neighbors and other institutions define them as a family unit; (4) the way in which members
of the unit come to rely on each other to provide daily family services; (5) the shared history of
the group as evidenced, for example, in the taking, displaying, and preserving of 'family' photos;
and (6) the high degree of religious and moral commitment" (523 N.Y.S.2d 9; 137 Misc. 2d 902).
Testimony from others provided some of the data on which Dr. Stein's opinion was based. A
neighbor testified that the decedent had said about the younger man, "He's my son now." A worker
in a local supermarket spoke of going "to see the family." A former employee at the rent-controlled
building provided perhaps the central imagery in response to a question on cross-examination as
to whether these three people were actually related: "I don't know if they were a family but they
acted like one" (523 N.Y.S.2d 8; 137 Misc. 2d 900–01). I would like to thank Dr. Peter Stein for
suggesting the use of this case, and discussing it with me, and to thank Lynn Martel of the NYU
Law Clinic for providing the citation.
13. c/o American Bar Association, 750 North Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60611 [(302)
988–5725]. Staff Director: John Paul Ryan.
14. One very interesting recent conference, entitled "American Citizenship and the Constitution,"
was held in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin, May 3-5, 1990, and involved almost a hundred undergraduate
faculty in many disciplines, including political science (many faculty from this discipline), history,
sociology (with only one faculty participant!), and anthropology.
15. That particular seminar failed for lack of registrants. 1 do not believe that a seminar on family
issues would meet a similar fate.
16. See, e.g., Article 12.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Connecticut State Uni-
versity American Association of University Professors and the Board of Trustees for Connecticut
State University currently in force.
17. The author of this paper has served several different times on the American Association of
University Professors negotiating team for the faculty of Connecticut State University, and has
found the process open to sociologically derived definitional construction of relevant terms such as
"immediate family."
